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S pinoza’s case for ontological monism is indeed an inter-esting one.  Beginning with the Cartesian metaphysical principles of substance and attribute, Spinoza believes himself to have demonstrated the underlying substantial 
uniformity of all beings, as he writes, “Except for God, no sub-
stance can be or be conceived.”1  However, the validity of his ar-
gument for monism is questionable, for when one considers care-
fully the meaning which Spinoza attaches to certain concepts, it 
becomes quite apparent that he fails to use such meaning consis-
tently.  More specifically, in the first part of his proof for mo-
nism, wherein he argues against the possibility of two infinite 
substances of distinct attributes, Spinoza equivocates on the term 
‘finite’, which thus undermines the validity of his entire demon-
stration. 
The following is divided into five sections.  In the first 
section, a very basic explication of substance and attribute within 
the Spinozistic metaphysics will be provided.  Following that 
consideration, in the second section, Spinoza’s argument for on-
tological monism will be clearly outlined and briefly explained.  
The third section will focus exclusively on Spinoza’s two fold 
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understanding of the term ‘finite’.  Considered in this section is 
an altogether crucial distinction that Spinoza himself makes, 
namely that between infinitude in kind and absolute infinitude.  
In the fourth section, Spinoza’s proof for monism will be recon-
sidered, and it will be here shown how such an argument does 
not necessitate the conclusion of ontological monism.  Lastly, the 
closing section will propose a possible solution, that is, a way in 
which the proof may be rendered valid.   
   
I.  SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE WITHIN A SPINOZISTIC 
METAPHYSICS 
Spinoza provides the following definition of substance:  “By sub-
stance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through 
itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of 
another thing, from which it must be formed.”2  From this defini-
tion, two points are particularly relevant.  First, one should note 
that, though Spinoza’s definition of substance as something con-
ceived through itself may seem strange, such a definition makes 
sense in light of the fact that, for Spinoza, the order of ideas per-
fectly corresponds to the order of things.3  In effect, something 
whose concept requires that of another is not only conceptually 
dependent, but is likewise ontologically dependent.  That is to 
say that, when one is required to think of y so as to form an 
‘adequate idea’4 of x, then x is dependent upon y, in the same 
way that an effect is dependent upon its cause.  Second, I think it 
important to point out that, like Descartes, Spinoza identifies 
substance as self-subsistent being.5  Put another way, the essence 
of substance contains existence, and, accordingly, substance 
taken alone provides a thorough account of its own actuality.   
To clarify Spinoza’s definition of substance, let’s consider 
the example of concavity.  In order to form a complete idea of 
concavity, that is, in order to explain the actual existence of con-
cavity, reference must be made to that being in which concavity 
inheres, as concavity is never found apart from factually existent 
beings.  Nevertheless, after taking into account that being in 
which concavity is present (e.g., a nose), one’s explanation of 
concavity is still not exhaustive, as one must next consider the 
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existence of that nose possessing concavity as its accident.  As it 
is not within the essence of a nose to exist, then one must ascribe 
a cause to the actual existence of such.  Ultimately, during the 
course of this account, one will arrive at a being whose existence 
is its essence and which can thus explain the existence of all other 
beings.  It is this being, then, that is the only true substance, for it 
is only this being that contains within itself a complete explana-
tion of its own nature and existence.6  
For Spinoza, while a substance is an independent exis-
tent, an attribute is that which the mind knows or apprehends of 
substance.  In Spinoza’s words, an attribute is “what the intellect 
perceives of substance, as constituting its essence.”7  As Spinoza 
will argue, though there is only one substance, it has an infinity 
of attributes through which it may be considered.8  Here, it is im-
portant to observe that the term ‘attribute’ in no way designates 
a purely arbitrary perspective that one assumes when examining 
substance.9  Indeed, if the order of ideas really does correspond 
to that of reality, then it is impossible to think of attributes as 
subjective interpretations of substance; instead, each attribute 
reflects in its own way one real aspect of substance, and, what’s 
more, each attribute provides a complete account of substance 
under that aspect.10   
 
II. SPINOZA’S ARGUMENT FOR ONTOLOGICAL  
MONISM                             
In the first half of his argument for monism, Spinoza presents us 
with a destructive dilemma.11  Beginning with the supposition 
that, if there are two or more substances, then such substances 
would either have to have the same attribute or a different attrib-
ute, Spinoza subsequently rules out the possibility of each conse-
quent and ultimately concludes that there is only one substance.  
Essentially, Spinoza’s argument runs as follows:12 
P1:   If there are two or more substances, then 
they either have the same attribute or a 
different attribute.      
P2:     Such substances cannot have the same at-
tribute, for if that were the case, then there 
Jennifer Lynn Daigle 8 
would be no way to discern one substance 
from another.13  
P3: Neither can substances have distinct  
 attributes.  This is so because: 
(P3a) Substance must be infinite, for if 
substance were finite, then such 
would require the existence of an-
other substance of the same attrib-
ute.  However, this is impossible, as 
has been shown in P2.14 
(P3b) To have two infinite substances is 
absurd, as it would mean that each 
substance contained an attribute 
that the other lacked.  However, by 
definition, infinite substances must 
contain all perfections.  Conse-
quently, to say that two substances 
possess distinct attributes is to si-
multaneously assert that such sub-
stances are finite, which is clearly a 
contradiction.15 
P4:  Substance cannot be produced by another 
substance and must therefore exist eter-
nally, for if such were not the case, then a 
substance would be dependent upon an-
other substance of the same attribute, 
which is impossible (P2), and an adequate 
concept of it would require that one con-
sider its cause, which, ex hypothesi, a sub-
stance cannot have.16 
C: Accordingly, since there can be only one 
substance containing an infinity of attrib-
utes, and since God is defined as that be-
ing which possesses all positive perfec-
tions, God is the only substance.17 
 
Now that the proof for monism has been generally out-
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lined, Spinoza’s justification for the third proposition listed 
above will be considered in greater detail, as it is within this sub-
argument that Spinoza gets particularly careless with his terms.  
However, before examining Spinoza’s defense of the third prem-
ise, it is crucial to first reflect upon what Spinoza means when 
qualifying something as finite. 
 
III.  SPINOZA’S TWO-FOLD UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
TERM ‘FINITE’ 
In Book I of his Ethics, Spinoza indicates two distinct understand-
ings of the term ‘finite’:  (1) finite within one’s attribute and (2) 
finite across all attributes.   Of course, inferable from these defini-
tions are two corresponding notions of the term ‘infinite’: (1) infi-
nite within one’s attribute and (2) infinite across all attributes.  In 
regard to finitude within one’s attribute, Spinoza states, “That 
thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by 
another of the same nature.”18  So, for instance, a body can be 
called finite or limited if it is possible to “conceive another that is 
greater.”  However, a body cannot be limited by thought nor 
thought by a body, as thought and body consist of altogether 
separate attributes.19  Accordingly, Spinoza’s distinction between 
the terms ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ with respect to one’s attribute can 
be summed up in the following.  Whereas ‘finite’ in this sense 
denotes that which is less great (i.e., that which requires another 
being of the same attribute to serve as its cause and explanation), 
‘infinite’ refers to that which is most great (i.e., that which is both 
the cause of and explanation for all finite beings within its class).     
To come to an understanding of the second definition of 
finite, namely that which is limited across all attributes, it is im-
portant to consider Spinoza’s definition of God, which is as fol-
lows:   
By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, 
that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of at-
tributes, of which each one expresses an eternal 
and infinite essence…..  I say absolutely infinite, 
not infinite in its own kind; for if something is 
only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite 
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attributes of it (i.e., we can conceive infinite attrib-
utes which do not pertain to its nature); but if 
something is absolutely infinite, whatever ex-
presses essence and involves no negation pertains 
to its essence.20   
 
In this description of God, Spinoza explicitly states that he is not 
referring to a being infinite within a particular kind, but instead a 
being infinite across all attributes insofar as it is possessive of 
each.  Given this view, an absolutely finite being, in contradis-
tinction to an absolutely infinite being, is that which lacks at least 
one positive perfection.  Simply put, a being is absolutely finite if 
it does not possess all attributes or positive perfections. 
An important question to address is how these two differ-
ing sets of finite and infinite beings relate to one another.  That is 
to say, to what extent does a particular being’s membership in 
one group necessitate its exclusion or inclusion in another 
group?  Consider, for instance, a being that is finite in relation to 
other beings possessing a common attribute.  As such, this being 
will necessarily fall into the absolutely finite class, as it cannot 
possibly possess all positive perfections if it is in fact lesser than 
another being within its own class.  Conversely, a being that is 
infinite in terms of its own kind does not of necessity fall into ei-
ther the absolutely finite or absolutely infinite set.  This is so be-
cause, though this being is infinite within its own attribute, it is 
still possible for it to lack all attributes across all sets of beings.  
Similarly, a being that is absolutely finite may nevertheless be 
infinite with respect to its own attribute; indeed, if one knows 
only that a being is finite across all attributes, one cannot thereby 
determine whether such a being is infinite or finite within its 
own attribute.  On the other hand, though it is not possible to 
determine the appropriate class for an absolutely finite being, it 
is immediately possible to designate the group wherein an abso-
lutely infinite being belongs.  As an absolutely infinite being con-
tains all positive attributes, it is impossible that there should exist 
any being within a particular class more perfect or greater than 
such.  In effect, if there were to exist an absolutely infinite being, 
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such would likewise be infinite with respect to each of its indi-
vidual attributes. 
 
IV.  AN EQUIVOCATION IN SPINOZA’S PROOF OF  
MONISM 
With the above definitions in mind, this section will now exam-
ine Spinoza’s argument for monism, and, more specifically, that 
part of such containing his defense of the third premise (i.e., that 
premise which asserts the impossibility of two substances pos-
sessing different attributes).  In justifying this claim, Spinoza be-
gins by arguing that, “Of its nature… [substance] will exist either 
as finite or as infinite.”21  From this, Spinoza next rules out the 
possibility of substance existing as finite:  “But not as finite.  For 
then (by D2) it would have to be limited by something else of the 
same nature, which would also have to exist necessarily (by P7), 
and so there would be two substances of the same attribute, 
which is absurd (by P5).”  In effect, if substance is not finite, then, 
as Spinoza affirms, “it exists as infinite.”22 
It should be here noted that, in establishing the infinite 
nature of substance, Spinoza relies upon the first definition of 
finite discussed above, which maintains that a substance is finite 
when it is limitable by another substance of the same attribute.  It 
goes without question that Spinoza has indeed successfully dem-
onstrated that substance is infinite within its own attribute, since 
the possibility of another substance having the same attribute has 
already been ruled out.23  Next, from the non-basic premise that 
substance must be infinite, Spinoza is led to address the further 
question as to whether there can be two or more infinite sub-
stances of distinct attributes.  To this, he responds in the nega-
tive:   
Since God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom 
no attribute which expresses an essence of sub-
stance can be denied (by D6)…if there were any 
substance except God, it would have to be ex-
plained through some attribute of God, and so 
two substances of the same attribute would exist, 
which (by P5) is absurd.24 
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In denying the possibility of two infinite substances with distinct 
attributes, Spinoza therefore concludes that substance is one and 
that it is identical with Deus sive Natura. 
Of principal importance to the present inquiry is a con-
sideration of the legitimacy of Spinoza’s appeal to the concept of 
God.  Given what he has established regarding the nature of sub-
stance, Spinoza has no reason here to identify God with sub-
stance, since he has demonstrated only that substance is infinite 
within its own attribute and not that it, like God, is infinite across 
attributes.  Indeed, if Spinoza had established the absolute infin-
ity of substance, then certainly it is not possible that there be 
more than one substance.  This is so because, if there were two 
absolutely infinite and distinct substances, then each would have 
to have an attribute that the other did not possess.  However, 
such a supposition is impossible, as, by definition, an absolutely 
infinite substance contains all attributes.  Nevertheless, this is not 
what Spinoza has hitherto demonstrated.  In effect, Spinoza has 
here too hastily equated substance with God, as he has yet to de-
termine that substance, like God, is absolutely infinite and not 
just infinite in relation to other beings of a particular attribute. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In thinking of possible ways to salvage Spinoza’s proof for mo-
nism, the following question must be addressed:  Is there ever an 
instance wherein infinitude within one’s kind likewise necessi-
tates infinitude across all attributes?  It would seem that there is 
indeed one such instance, that being when the attribute is identi-
fied with Being itself.  Undoubtedly, it is only in this special case 
that it can be so claimed that a thing’s status as infinite within its 
attribute requires that it likewise have the quality of infinitude 
across all attributes.  If it is possible to conceive the totality of 
what is under the all-inclusive attribute of existence, and if a 
thing’s reality is in some way a function of its attributes, then 
surely that which is the highest manifestation of Being is, at the 
same time, that which is possessive of all positive attributes.  
Now, it can certainly be argued that this is precisely what 
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Spinoza has in mind when equating infinitude within one’s kind 
and infinitude across all attributes.  In fact, Spinoza himself does 
claim that existence pertains to the nature of substance25 and that 
the reality of a thing is the direct product of the number of attrib-
utes contained by that thing.26  Even still, though the idea of ex-
emplary causality is incorporated within the Spinozistic meta-
physics, the validity of Spinoza’s argument for ontological mo-
nism is put in to question due to his failure to make explicit his 
reasons for identifying infinitude within one’s attribute and in-
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